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THE BALTIMORE APPLI%o'AT:ONS PROJECT: AN EXPERIMENT IN TECHNOLOC
by
Thomas S. Golden
Goddard Space Flight Center
Greenbelt, MD
ABSTRACT
A program to assist the City of Baltimore in solving some of its problems
through technology has been underway for fi,,e years. The activity has
been intentionally low profile to enhance the focus on the problem and
not on the expectations from the relationship. The experiment, known as
the NASA/Baltimore Applications Project, has been conducted by a NASA
technologist working full-time in the Office of the Mayor. A continuing
liaison with the Goddard Space Flight Center, other federal agencies
and academia has covered a wide scope of tasks. "First cut" assistance
has dominated the activity; implementation has been performed by city
employees, frequently through private industry.
Among the conciusions drawn from the experiment thus far are that 1) the
problems of a large city most often do not require highly sophisticated
solutions--in fact, the simpler the solution, the better; 2) a problem-
focused approach is a greater help to the city than a product-focused
approach; 3) most problem situations involve several individuals or
organized groups within the city; 4) mutual trust and good interpersonal
relationships between the technologist and the administrator is as
important for solving problems as technological know-how.
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THE NASA/BALTIMORE APPLICATIONS PROJECT: AN EXPERIMENT IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this paper is to describe those factors that have been found
to be appropriate in technology transfer activities through the NAWBaltimore
Applications Project (BAP) in the City of Baltimore. On the basis of the
findings of this experiment it appears that most programs to transfer technology
to cities and towns in the U.S. fail to recognize several necessary features
r
of the process. What follows is a brief review of the BAP, the ground .;es
and rationale of the experiment, a description of the approach to technology
transfer that was used, and finally, drawing on this experience, a statement
of what the author believes to be the essentials to a proper technology transfer
process.
BACKGROUND OF THE EXPERIMENT
At the specific request of the City of Baltimore, the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) through its Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)
at Greenbelt, Maryland engaged in a program to assist the City with technology.
The program, which is experimental in nature, was named the NASA/Baltimore
Applications Project (BAP). It has been in operation since May 6, 1974. In
this experience a number of things have been learned about technology transfer
to a local government. Some of the findings about the transfer process are
discussed here with a particular emphasis on suggested approaches that might
be followed by any city that wants to obtain technological help. For details
of specific BAP events the reader is referred to the annual reports of the
experiment. (See Bibliography)
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There is considerable recent history of programs and plans of formation of
institutions, consortia and other groups that are concerned with improving
the transfer of technology to solve problems in U.S. cities and towns. There
appear to be a number and variety of drivers to institutionalize this assistance
activity. Among these are for-profit business, not-for-profit business,
special interest groups (e.g. the U.S. Conference of Mayors, League of Cities,
National Association of State Legislatures, etc.), federal technological
agencies, academia and, in addition, the U.S. Congress. With such "horsepower"
one might expect great things to be happening--and some good things are. How-
ever, the relationship existing between the government of a city and the work
of technology remains a very complex and a very fragile one. The fragility
and the complexity suggest a need for adequately deliberate, well thought-out
attempts to unite the two. H. L. Mencken, the satirist of Baltimore, is reported
to have said, "For every complex problem there is a simple solution ... and it's
wrong." While the present flurry in the world of technology transfer is not
necessarily "wrong," (it's probably too early in the process to assess that)
a number of our activities don't seem to be bearing the fruits expected. There
have been several p^ojects and a lot of discussion of transfer activity, but
to the author's knowledge no outstanding track record has developed as yet.
There is no paradigm of emulatable success. An attenm^t will be made in what
follows to describe some things that in the author's opinion are basic to the
success of this fragile and complex technology transfer process. These obser-
vations are based on five and a half years of operation of the NASA /Baltimore
Applications Project (BAP). The author has been privileged to serve as Director
of the project since its beginning in May 1974, so it is a firsthand, " hands-on"
accounting.
9-
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)RIGINS
the first visible event in establishing the BAP was a letter from Robert Embry,
:onmissioner of Housing and Community Development for the City, to the NASA
Administrator. But there must have been several things in Baltimore that pre-
ceded this letter. What triggered the whole idea was Embry's reading in the
New York Times of an event in which New York City had received specific technical
assistance from the federal government for one of their city departments. Embry's
letter essentially said, "Whom do we see to get help for Baltimore?" It was
followed in a few days by a letter from then Congressman, now Senator, Paul Sarbanes
to the Administrator saying "I urge a prompt response." Because of the proximity
of the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) in Greenbelt, Maryland to Baltimore,
our Center was selected by the NASA Administrator to carry out further conver-
sations with the City. It is important to note that GSFC had the option to
stop or go ahead with the experime=nt at this juncture. The policy of Goddard's
management at that time was to offer help to the community so long as it did
not interfere with the on-going Center mission. The Baltimore experiment is
really a Goddard experiment; that is while we had the endorsement of NASA
Headquarters, we had the sole responsibility for its undertaking and its
consequences.
Following the initial letter from Baltimore were several meetings between
Goddard and Baltimore personnel. It was decided in these discussions to have
the project director located in the Mayor's Office and have the Director carry
out, independently, a program to provide technological assistance to the City
over a period of two years. There was a pretty intensive search for the person
to be the project director, and the author was fortunate to have been selected.
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One condition caning out of the discussions was that either party could termi-
nate the experiment at any time, or for any reason. After the two year experi-
mental period, the project relationship continued at the request of the City
of Baltimore for more than four additional years, and has now grown into a
sort of continuing relationship. An important point to be made here is the
City took the initiative and asked for assistance. There are some subtle issues
connected with that event which will be discussed later.
GETTING STARTED
In 1974 there was no precedent for such a continuing activity, so the BAP
Director was free k10 do whatever appeared to be most suitable to help Baltimore
with and thrnuah technology. A study of the City organization showed that the
Mayor had arranged his government in Baltimore into two separate operations
which he called "cabinets"--one addressed the physical plant and operations
part of the municipal function--the other attended to the human and social
service element of the city. The functioning departments of most any city may
be quite naturally separated into these two categories. The Department of
Finance for obvious reasons is represented in both cabinets.
After a few weeks on the job it was clear that the dominantly technological
activity in the City operations was in the physical development cabinet.
K. Bernie Berkowitz, the Mayor's Physical Development Coordinator and the
principal interface for our experiment, had suggested that this might be true.
Although there were 21 City Departments, all of these did not routinely attend
their respective Cabinet meetings; they became involved usually if and when
the need to do so demanded. Therefore, the attendees (active membership) of
these two Cabinets comprised the more routinely active Departments. The resulting
5functional Cabinet structure is shown below. This then allowed for a natural
separation of the originally 21 City Departments into two groups of technolog-
ically intensive departments and discussion with them on just 4hat they perceived
their problems to be.
Technology Classification of Departments
Intensive	 I	 Less Intensive
Education
Fire
Health
Hospitals
Housing & Community Devel
Planning
Police
Public Works
Recreation & Parks
Transit & Traffic
Assessments
Audit
Comptroller
Economic Development
t Finance
Law
Legislative Reference
Post•Mortem Examiners
Real Estate
Social Services
Treasurer
In time and with further discussion with department subordinates, a list of
tasks or technology areas that were fairly well objectified and defined was
developed. The next step was one of searching for solutions to each one of
these for a variety of solutions, if you will. It is important to note that
these were tasks that came from the City officials themselves. They were not
derived from technology that happened to be familiar to the BAP experiment
director or to NASA; they were derived directly from the discussions with
City officials.
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Figure A presents a listing of the higher priority tasks at the end of two
years. Figure B shows a similar listing of lower priority tasks. The first
6column is a listing of the tasks identified at that time. The second column
shows a Roman numeral I, II, or III representing an increasing level of sophis-
tication of the technology seemingly needed for the task. The important factors
in the remaining columns are the Goddard or non-city personnel and the Baltimore
person responsible for the task area. In this case the role that was played
by the BAP directcr was that of technology broker. It was important to the
project that the City department heads know that the project director couldn't
or didn't personally know all the answers. In the majority of cases shown, a
linkage was made between the Baltimore personnel and NASA or other personnel
knowledgeable for the specific task. Incidentally the "N's" indicate a direct
NASA relationship to a given technology area. Overall there has been about a
35 percent ratio of Baltimore task areas to NASA experiences and GSFC operating
experience.
There have been some formal studies of the actors involved in this part of the
process of technology transfer. Perhaps the most notable is that of Lambright
and Teich i in which they identify (very logically) a triad of actors.
7The Baltimore experience bears this concept out with one major condition imposed.
In a given task it has been our experience that a role is most often played by
many individual actors. In the task involving solar heating for the Upton
Community Center, for example, the list of actors includes:
Bureau of Construction
Architect
Engineering Subcontractor
Technology Advisor
Neighborhood Citizens
Mayor
Physical Development Cabinet
Department of Enc>•gy (Grantors)
Procurement Officer
Building Contractor
Hardware/Software Vendor
The triad model thus is a definite but logical simplification of the reality
experienced in practice.
After about two-and-a-half years the problem identification type of activity
seemed to decrease and more time was spent in providing counsel, advice and
assistance with implementation procedures. Among the present areas of continu-
ing activity are energy cost concerns, computer use in the Health Department,
and a computer-aided-dispatch system for the Fire Department.
In March 1977 the report of an evaluating panel was published. 2 The panel was
organized by the National Academy of Pablic Administration (NAPA) under a NASA
contract. it was chaired by Dr. Ruth Davis, now an Undersecretary for the
Department of Energy. The panel carried out interviews and discussions with
Baltimore, Goddard and other personnel to effect their evaluation role. The
general conclusion of the panel -;#as that the Baltimore experiment was a unique
and worthwhile approach to technology transfer. They recommended that the
same techniques and approaches be tried in other cities and towns. Since that
time, Goddard has become involved with five other cities in Maryland. However,
there is insufficient experience in these places to draw substantive conclusions
at this time.
SOME THINGS LEARUD
An important remaining question is whether the procedure used by Baltimore, NASA
and Goddard to set up this experiment is appropriate to establishing technology
transfer relationships in any city or town that wants help. There are some key
observatiors and some rather basic conclusions that can be extracted from the
Baltimore experience.
What are the essentials for any city to find the kind of technological help it
needs? These are some of the subtle issues mentioned earlier. let us consider
this question from four aspects: The roles of the city, the general requirements
of the process, the technologist, and the program sponsor.
First, the city--they must be aware of their need for hea p with technology.
There is usually awareness of need for some kind of help, but it may not be
focused, for example, on technological areas. There must be a faith that real
help is available. Without this an air of distrust and unbelief ca- devc'on.
9It takes a modicum of self-confidence on the part of the city to ask for help.
An air of failure or inadequacy can develop when a city administrator or poTi-
tician admits he needs help. For his political survival he must move carefully,
but, move, he Faust. Lastly for the city, there must be a willingness to experi-
ment. There is attached here the possibility that a technological innovation
or solution might fail. The willingness on the part of the elected officials
to take that risk must prevail. I believe all four of these elements were
present in Baltimore at the time they sent the letter to the NASA Administrator.
While there are numerous references to statements about the needs of politicians
for power not advice, it has been the authors experience in Baltimore that the
first need is to overcome the feeling of not being threatened by technology.
For The City
Awareness of their need for help
Belief in the Availability of Help
Adequate Self-Confidence
Willingness to Experiment
Second, the Process -much  has been said about "user pull". It is a facet of
technology transfer which I feel to be absolutely required. There are many
examples of "non-pulled" attempts at transfers where the motives of one or more
participants were not consistent with a sincere desire for help which is the
definition of user pull. Closely related to sincere user pull for technological
assistance is the need for focus on the problem. Here the action of the
IO
technologist must be relevant to the solving of the problem, not an attempt to
"sell" a particular technology as a solution. So often well meaning technologists
want to explore the ways in which the technology with which he is most special-
ized can be brought tc bear on the problem.
The process should be one which maintains a reasonably low overall profile. Some
exposure or hoopla is necessary, particularly at the beginning, but when the
exposure gets too high or lasts too long, the tendency is to heighten expecta-
tions beyond a realistic taint of achievement. Maintaining the atmosphere of
an experiment helps here.
A classical scientific approach to solving problems should be followed. This
approach is used wherever possible in Baltimore. Elements of this stepped
process ?re: First, identifying and defining the problem; this is accomplished
through mutual discussions between Baltimore officials and the appropriate
technologists. Second, searching for a variety of solutions. This search
encompasses the technical literature, existing data bases, discussions with
recognized and knowledgeable people in NASA and other federal agencies and in
academia and industry. The idea is to get a number of approaches, suggestions,
examples of related experience or alternatives in the search for possible
solutions. Third, presenting these solutions to the responsible Baltimore
officials. The technologist returns to the responsible local officials to
array the alternatives before him and together evaluate each one from a
technical standpoint. The technologist should remember in this part of the
activity that the local official has the continuing responsibility for the
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area in which the problem has been identified. It is relatively easy for a
capable technologist to provide answers in the technological realm. Often the
technologist is lacking in his knowledge of those non-technical realms so
important to operating d government that is responsive to its constitutents.
This is the "politics" of the decision process. Fourth, helping the local
officials to evaluate or weigh their options if they want that kind of help.
It is important for the decisions to be made P the local officials. Continu-
ing advice and counsel should be made available if needed. One of the more
important elements of technology transfer activity is the search for as many
alternatives to solving a problem as can be found. The experience of the
writer in the BAP indicates that any option, including "none of the above,"
is best made by the responsible local official, the technologist serving
principally as the source and communicator of technical knowledge and potential
impacts for the local official in making this decision.
One final aspect of the process should be mentioned. The technologist must
have a very high degree of freedom to carry out his function. For this reason
the amount of reporting required and the schedule milestones to be met should
be minimized. Some reporting and review is helpful to the transfer process.
In the Baltimore experience an annual report has seemed to satisfy these needs.
For The Process
User Pull
Problem (not product) focus
Low Program Profile
Stepped Process
Minimum Reporting/Scheduling
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Now let us turn to the role of the technol2gist--First, he must be there. He
must be an obvious, available technologist-in-residence. It may be possible
to have regular "office days" several days per week; but there should be no
perceptible barriers to his availability to officials in the city he's trying
to serve. He should literally be "the city's technologist." The task of trans-
ferring technology to solve problems can't be effectively done in isolation or
by remote control.
Second, it is important for the technologist to listen. This helps to assure
the most complete statement of the problem as seen by the local official. It
is so easy for the technologist to jump ahead to what might appear to be an
appropriate technology with which he is familiar and to cane up with a solution
strategy before the whole picture is explained, or before due consideration of
long term consequences is assessed. He could miss something by not hearing
the whole story.
Third, the technologist (and the city officials as well) should recognize that
no one person can have answers to every technological question that arises.
When the area of coriv.ern is unfamiliar, the proper role for the technologist
tends to become one of brokering. He should find persons who are specialists
in the relevant area and enlist their help. This is where access to a capable
sponsoring center or backup laboratory is of great value; the technologist-in-
residence should search, there for the needed expertise first. Through his own
knowledge, the advice of others or the evidences of literature research through
his center library, he can usually identify persons in other Federal agencies,
nearby academes or the appropriate commercial sector who can offer expert -eunsel
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and advice on a subject. Whatever the source of expertise the technologist-
in-residence should now play the role of critical learner and do his best to
assure that the expert provides a complete description of the technique in
question.
Lastly, the technologist should only rarely get involved with unilateral deci-
sion making about best options. These decisions are best made jointly with
the city official. It should be further noted that the best technological
option may not be the best implementable solution to the original problem. It
must be recognized that there is a political dimension to some decisions. These
decisions can and should be made by officials who are directly responsible to
the people, the local elected officials.
For most technologists the opportunity to study the internal operations of a
city and to observe the objectives and motivations of the operating departments
is rare indeed. A lack of such knowledge and understanding by technologists
can be a serious barrier to providing proper assistance. It may be that some
city administrators, having been so engrossed in keeping the sometimes creaky
operations going, also suffer from a dimming of their objective. A city's
chief function is the provision of public facilities and services for its citi-
zens. This gives the city a dynamic kind of appearance, but it necessitates a
continuous or operational character to the functions for which the city govern-
ment is responsible. A city that has one or more individuals dedicated to
"planning"is fortunate; it is rare that the planners can assume the role of a
technological research and development department. Many planning decisions are
associated with "growth" or with regional change and development. These are
not intimately connected with technology in general or with specific knowhow
(e.g., energy recovery from solid waste) in particular. Most cities have no
14
continuing need for this kind of technical expertise in-house- -knowledge so
k
specific and in the required depth is not a part of the normal city operations.
This is not to say that a city does not need knowledgeable technical operators.
It is that most of the technical skills needed to date are operationally
oriented. The situation indicates that in-house technical expertise ("capacity")
or a broad based technologist-in-residence might be a valuable adjunct to a
city in planting its future. This must be recognized and the responsibility
felt by the technologist involved.
In the BAP experiment the technologist-in-residence is called upon to play a
variety of roles. Several seem to stand out. Baltimore's original unsolicited
request for assistance characterized, implicitly at least, the roles ofrp oblem
identifier and problem definer. Once contact with a local administrator is
established, problems which the administrator and the interviewer feel are
important appear; a problem seeker role emerges. This evolves to a role as
technology assessor. Insight as to where to get good information on potential
solutions necessitates a role as information gatherer or agent. A mix of
intelligence, skill and humility is needed because a technologist-in-residence
is not likely to be expert in all the areas he is likely to encounter. He must
become a sort of technology broker, who knows when to seek assistance, where to
go for the best information and how to present his findings to the person with
the original problem. This latter need calls for a role as teacher.
On the basis of the BAP experiment there are several other recognizable roles.
Some of these fall directly into the adviser category; others are akin to
15
ombudsman. Sometimes the role as grantsmen must be played. Lastly, there
are the roles of doer of a task or "doer-watcher," where an expert from anbther
federal agency or outside organization is called in to do a task and the
technologist-in-residence is there to introduce peot.e and to monitor progress
•	 in the name of the city.
For The Technologist
Be There
Listen
Get Good Help
Joint Effort With Local Officials
Multiple Roles
Finally, let us discuss the role of the program sponsor in the technology trans-
fer experiment. This participant in the experiment is usually overlooked since
traditionally the sponsor has been at the front end of the event. However, the
technology transfer experiment always has more than one prime mover or stake-
holder. (cf. the Lambright and Teich triad) As a result, there needs to be a
better recognition and delineation of the role for the program sponsor. The
sponsor's responsibility to the other principals must be better identified than
it has been in the past.
First, given adherence to the process conditions just discussed, there should
be a gracious or eleemosynary atmosphere developed by the technology center or
agency sponsoring the program and those experts in technology who get involved.
I.
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The center should be willing to commit the best manpower available to provide
the best technological advice. It should be willing to underwrite the technol-
ogist's salary along with small discretionary costs for supporting literature,
library searches, travel, etc. The attitude of the center should not be one
of using the experiment to find places to apply its own technology, but should
focus on solving the city's problems with the most appropriate technology
wherever the search might lead. Honest objectivity should prevail--huckstering
is non-productive and undesirable.
The whole enterprise will benefit from a kind of good neighbor philosophy in
the center management and project staffing. Things which are done by the center
for the community in which it exists are usually benefiting the center's own
employees since they are likely to be citizens of that community. The center
must account for the funding of the experiment. The funding required is likely
to be small relative to other center programs. Items other than routine salary,
etc. might be made available through a discretionary center director's account.
Large expenditures by a city are usually made available through routine channels
such as bond issues, federal grants or the general fund. If a center director
has no community feeling or no discretionary funding or manpower prerogative,
he should clearly never allow a program of this type to start, since only nega-
tive results are likely to be achieved. There needs to be an environment, in
the sponsoring center, of encouragement and approval. When the technologist
on-site in the city comes back to the center and asks for the best experts to
assist him, those experts should feel the personal freedom and the approval of
management to give their best. However, problems of recruiting the most capable
help sometimes arise due to other job priorities. Center management should set
17
the tone of the program in the beginning by encouraging participation by the
best people available whenever practicable and giving the City's problem the
same level of support as other on-going center programs. Thus the City's
problem is made equal in i!r.rnrtance to others at the center. With this endorse-
ment of center management support it is felt that qualified participants will
be more inclined to get involved and find the time in their busy schedules to
assist the technologist in his quest for solutions.
For The Program Sponsor
Benevoieot Atmosphere
Best Available Manpower
Small Discretionary Costs
Good Neighbor Attitude
Encouraging Approving Environment
Experimental
Minimum (Zero) Institutionalization or Bureaucratizing
Minimum Reporting/Milestones
These conditions or requirements for providing help with technology call for
courage to experiment, to depart from the routine procedures and relationships.
That courage must be a ground rule for all who would participate at whatever
level of their involvement.
CONCLUSION
In summary of the foregoing comments it is possible to cite some essential
factors that should be recognized by all participants.
18
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I. A city is basically people living in community.
2. A city has a basic requirement to provide services and facilities for
its citizens.
3. There are "people" problems and there are "technology" problems—
the difference must be recognized.
4. There must be an awareness by both the elected and the administrative
officials of a need for advice in re technology by the city. The city, because
of its operational nature, has great difficulty in keeping up with the state-
of-the-art of all the technology with which it could be involved.
5. The city's need is for good advice, not just dollars. While every
city could do more and probably do it better with additional money, the basic
need in the realm of technology is for good advice. Money alone can buy advice,
but it may not be "good" advice. A capable technologist-in-residence can help
to assure the quality of the advice procured.
6. The elected and administrative officials should have an honest and
objective assessment of their city's intrinsic capability (capacity) for under-
standing and dealing with technology. The level of a city's capability may
actually be low; however, an honest assessment of that (low) level is most
advisable. While local officials may not like to admit certain incapacity, the
price to be paid for less-than-candid assessment can be large expenditures for
things that are oversize, undersize, or which don't work.
7. The benefit afforded by the traditional problem solving sequence
should he recognized. That hierarchy is simply to: a) define the problem,
b) search for a number of possible solutions, c) evaluate each solution as
objectively as possible, d) select the "best" solution, e) place and carry out
the implementation and f) adjust and adapt as needed to optimize results.
19
8. When a city chooses to fill a technologist-in-residence position, the
person selected should establish or have a working relationship with a nearby
public (possibly private or academic) technology-based institution, if this is
possible. Arrangement should be made so that the institution will serve as a
`	 resource for modern technical information and know-how.
9. The technologist should have his base of operations in the city he's
trying to help. He must be available to city officials.
10. In conducting a technology assistance program, benefit often derives
from recognizing the enterprise (certainly the early stages) as an experiment.
The nature of the experimental atmosphere helps provide for a) ability to stop
activity at any time; b) a high degree of objectivity in establishing the
schedule and conduct in the program, and c) reasonable expectations. It also
helps the jurisdictional government to avoid the opprobrium of failure. In
some cases it may be possible to perform scaled-down experiments and save on
costs. The hazard of scaling down too far (too much difference in the experi-
ment and the full-size model) must be noted and avoided.
Lastly,it must be recognized that the interrelationship for providing assistance
with technology to a city or town is a fragile one at this time; it is likely
to remain so in future years. The problem is really not technology or exotic
unsolvable problems. It is not a lack of interest in the subject of technology
for the public benefit or of willingness of all parties to get involved. The
problem is really one of knowing where and how to get started. And, most
importantly, there is a misunderstanding of the roles each actor should play
and of the proper place of technology withal. This misunderstanding, with all
the unknowns and untrieds, can lead to a real fear of getting involved. City
rt
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officials are not conversant with the l atest in technology; there may be
little on-site "technological capacity." Technologists are not cognizant of
all the vagaries of politics or public administration. This lack of knowledge
of each other ' s worlds tends to heighten distrust and fear on all sides.
Some day there may be a fully institutionalized technology transfer function,
but it will not be born easily. It must be born with a sense of personal
trust between all participants. The strategy presented here, in the opinion
of the author, is a necessary development before institutionalization takes
place.
In summary on the basis of the BAP experience in Baltimore, technology itself,
either hard or soft, is likely to be less of a barrier to assistance to a city
than the personal or organizational motivation of the participants in the
transfer process.
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